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sarily decides whether the defendant must demonstrate his honestly in-
dustrial methods or the Government must prove the putative mono-
polizer's willfully predatory connivances.
In favoring the latter approach, the Supreme Court emasculates the
district court's pronouncement and recedes drastically from the virtual
per se position advanced in Alcoa. Mere monopoly power becomes neither
presumptive nor essentially conclusive evidence of a Sherman section 2
violation. More importantly, Grinnell revitalizes the "rule of reason" as
conceived in 1911 by Mr. Justice White and particularized in 1918 by Mr.
Justice Brandeis. 1 With reference to "monopolizing," this concept envi-
sions an exploration of the reasonableness of the monopolist's methods. In
essence, a demonstration of willful, predatory tactics becomes an in-
dispensible ingredient to branding the defendant monopolist as unreason-
able and, consequently, offensive to the antitrust laws. Although Grinnell
and its affiliates lost the instant case, the necessitated inquiry into the
manners of the monopolist resuscitates, legally, the monopolist with
integrity, and alleviates the paradoxical Alcoa doctrine by heralding will-
ful, positive drive as the touchstone of a Sherman section 2, "monopoliz-
ing" transgression.
H. Kennedy Linge
TRADE REGULAIONs-Group Boycott-Restraint of Trade-A joint
refusal to deal resulting in an exclusion of traders from the competitive
market is a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
In a civil action brought by the United States Government, defendants,
General Motors Corporation and three Chevrolet dealer associations, were
held to have violated the prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
21. In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Mr. Justice
White conceptualized the "rule of reason." Briefly this concept demands an inquiry into
the purpose, power and effect and requires a definite factual showing of illegality of a de-
fendant's conduct. An eminent enumeration of the considerations involved was advanced
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In that case, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, at 238, dissected and analyzed, ". .. the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its conditions before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
he attained, are all relevant facts." In many areas of antitrust law, the "rule of reason"
has been discarded in favor of per se or virtual per se principles; this decision may fore-
shadow its revival.
1. The statute reads in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
[Vol. 5:222
RECENT DECISIONS
The dealers operated in accordance with a customary uniform dealer
selling agreement. There were no express customer or territorial limita-
tions incorporated in these agreements with the exception of a provision
(herein referred to as the "location clause") prohibiting the franchised
dealer from establishing "a new or different location, branch sales office,
branch service station, or place of business . . .without the prior written
approval of General Motors." 2
In the 1950's the franchised dealers were found to be supplying discount
houses with automobiles that were being sold at alleged bargain prices.3
The number of franchised dealers using these discounters to increase their
sales and profits increased to the extent that nonparticipating dealers
began to protest that they were losing sales and were obligated to service
the cars sold by the discount houses. Ensuing complaints to Chevrolet's
Los Angeles manager and protest letters to General Motors elicited repri-
mands that resulted in the eventual abandonment of all practices with
the discounters on the part of the dissident dealers.' Defendants then
proceeded to finance a policing arrangement that resulted in detection of
certain transgressors who were ultimately compelled to repurchase their
infractious sales.
On these facts the United States District Court concluded that the
proof failed to establish a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
The Supreme Court, in reversing, decided that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the effect of the "location clause" under section 1 when there was
present a "classic conspiracy in restraint of trade."6 It further stated that
the lower court failed to apply the correct and established standard for
ascertaining the existence of a violation of this section.
In order to facilitate the analysis of the instant fact situation under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, it is necessary to examine the act's two
distinguishable criteria. The first criterion, "contract, combination, or
conspiracy," has been a prolific source of confusion for the courts which
must define these terms and decide when and how they are to be applied
to sundry situations. All three terms do, however, have one thing in com-
mon which many courts look for in applying this criterion, and that is
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964 ed.).
Prior to the civil action an unsuccessful criminal action was brought against defendants
wherein the court stated that the government did not sustain its burden of proof. United
States v. General Motors Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. 9170, 704 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
2. 384 U.S. at 130.
3. These practices took on a variety of forms with some discounters buying cars out-
right from the dealers and reselling them, while others merely acted as referral services.
4. By the Spring of 1961 the discounters had successfully been eliminated from the
Chevrolet market.
5. Under section 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964 ed.), the case may go
on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
6. 384 U.S. at 140.
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an agreement, whether it be express or implied.' The confusion arises
when the courts must distinguish between what constitutes an agreement
as opposed to unilateral or parallel action, neither of which conform to
the first test. The principle of unilateral action as contrasted with collabor-
ative action entrenched itself in Sherman Act terminology through the
Colgate case.8 It was there that the court unequivocally stated that a
unilateral refusal to deal was permissible notwithstanding the fact that
if the refusal was accomplished by agreement it would be unlawful. Later
cases severely restricted what the Colgate court described as unilateral
action,9 and some writers even intimate that the later cases have com-
pletely emasculated the concept of unilateral action to the extent that
mere acquiescence in a unilateral demand may constitute an agreement
within the proscriptions of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'" These con-
clusions, however, are dubious in light of some recent decisions that have
seemingly revived the Colgate holding."
The Court in the instant case relied primarily on the Parke, Davis
holding' 2 in applying the first criterion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
It emphasized that no explicit agreement was necessary when "joint
collaborative action was pervasive in the initiation, execution and ful-
7. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 42 (1960); Turner, The Defini-
tion of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal,
75 HA~v. L. REv. 655, 685 (1962).
8. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
9. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960), wherein the Court
found that defendants exceeded the scope of the Colgate case when they announced that
they would refuse to deal with wholesalers who sold to price-cutting retailers with whom
defendants had severed relations; United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S. 85
(1920), wherein the Court found an implied agreement to maintain prices by excluding
traders who failed to adhere; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944), where the Court found an implied conspiracy in the enforcement of a resale price
maintenance scheme by refusing to sell to non-cooperating retailers.
10. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, supra note 7 at 705, 706; Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 847, 856 (1955) ; United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29, 57 (dissenting opinion), as to the destructive effect the majority opinion has on the
Colgate case.
,11. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 325 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963), reversing
206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962), where the court clearly distinguished between unilateral
and collaborative action in holding that a manufacturer by severing relations with a price
cutting retailer, even with information supplied by another of his retailers, still proceeded
naturally and unilaterally so as not to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act; Graham v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d
775 (3d Cir. 1965), where the court held it permissible for a publisher to refuse to sell
papers to anyone having service charges on the sale at the complaints of the subscribers;
discussed more fully in Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct
Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 590, 592-597 (1965) and maintain-
ing the still present vitality of the Colgate holding.
12. 384 U.S. at 143.
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fillment of the plan."'8 The Court also held that collaborative action had
in fact been exercised horizontally between the association dealers and
vertically between those associations and General Motors. 4 These find-
ings of fact coupled with the strict application of the holding in the
Parke, Davis case enabled the Court to readily find the necessary agree-
ment in the instant case to conform to the first criterion of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and to reject any contention of unilateral or parallel
action.
The second criterion, "restraint of trade," originally employed a "rule
of reason" in its interpretation and application:' 5 if the conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances as having economic justification, the
courts did not consider it a "restraint of trade" even though it did have
an anti-competitive result. Gradually the courts began applying an illegal
per se principle to certain types of anti-competitive conduct that were so
pernicious and inimicable to the concepts of free trade and competition
that reason and motive were irrelevant. The resale price maintenance
cases' 6 provide typical examples of such per se violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act as "restraints of trade."
In the instant case the Court applied a per se illegal approach to facts
amounting to a group boycott or joint refusal to deal resulting in the
exclusion of traders from the free market. For support of this per se class-
ification the Court relied primarily on the Klor's'1 and Fashion Guild 8
cases, both in which the Court summarily condemned a joint refusal to
deal by refusing to admit evidence as to the reasonableness of the acts.' 9
Although the status of group boycotts in similar situations is indis-
putably established, 0 it must further be determined whether it is the
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 140.
15. Standard Oil Co., v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
17. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). In this case manu-
facturers and distributors of electrical appliances conspired with a major retailer, Broadway-
Hale, to sell to Klor's only at unfavorable and discriminatory prices. The Court decided
that this was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
18. Fashion Originator's Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S.
457 (1941). In this case group action amounting to a refusal to sell to retailers who
patronized style pirates was declared per se illegal.
19. Note that defendants in both Klor's and Fashion Guild were charged also with
violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the Clayton Act respectively,
both dealing witV monopolistic proscriptions. The significance of these monopolistic overtones
in the ultimate decision of illegality, however, is negligible in light of the instant case which
although devoid of any monopolistic allegations was just as readily renounced by the Court
as illegal per se.
20. See Ruddy Brook Clothes Inc. v. British Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d, 86
(7th Cir. 1952) cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952), wherein the court held it permissible for
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concept of group boycott alone that is accorded a per se approach or
whether this concept must be combined with an anti-competitive result.
The first approach would be preferred, since the Courts' disregard of the
anti-competitive result is manifest in their decisions which neglect to
distinguish between the different results that each group boycott might
induce,2 1 and merely proceed to unequivocally anathematize the means
of obtaining the result-the joint refusal to deal-as so inherently offen-
sive that by its very nature it adversely affects competition. This analysis
seems especially cogent when the Court, as in the instant case, regards
the anti-competitive result, a form of customer restriction which has
generally been accorded justification by reason in the past 22 as illegal
per se when associated with a group boycott. There is, however, some
authority for the position that no definitive or uniform rule can be
formulated to establish precisely what facts are accorded the per se
approach in the boycott cases; and this conclusion is drawn from the
ambiguous language used in the Court's decisions.
2 3
Perhaps if the Court in the instant case had not declined to consider
the effect of the "location clause" under section 1, it would have compared
its effect to the group boycott approach and consequently explained just
what aspect of the factual situation was accorded per se illegality. Al-
though the validity of a "location clause" is generally accepted in light
of Borro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,24 in which an identical
"zone of influence" agreement was upheld, it becomes questionable
whether or not the clause can be validly construed to include a form of
customer restriction, as would be necessary in the present case. For the
purposes of discussion it will be conceded that the clause does, so the
defendants to concertedly refuse to sell insurance to a customer and stated that such actions
were subject to reasonable justification. Also Barber, supra note 10 at 876, suggesting that
perhaps there is a de minimus area in which group boycotts might be considered legal.
21. In the Klor's case the anti-competitive effect was neither pleaded or proved since
the removal of one competitor from the market had no obvious adverse effects. And in
the instant case the anti-competitive result was obvious in the exclusion of many traders
that possibly stimulated competition.
22. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. F.T.C., 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), held customer re-
strictions necessary to insure competition; Revlon Products Corp. v. Bernstein, 119 N.Y.S.2d
60 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1139, 142 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1955),
allowed restrictions on jobbers only to sell to beauty parlors and schools; Fosburgh v.
California & Hawaiian Sugar Refining Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923), upheld a customer
restriction not allowing the purchaser to resell sugar. See generally Robinson, Restraint on
Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 254 (1960).
23. Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the
Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (1956). This writer points out tfhat the Court in
the Klor's case as in past boycott cases failed to explain its holding in regard to group
boycotts and concluded that no definitive answer can be established from the language of
the -cases.
24. 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
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Court in deciding the validity of the "location clause" with this inclusion
must examine the customer restriction as historically analyzed-in light
of reason and motive25 to determine if it constitutes a "restraint of trade."
And the present Court's disregard of this conventional analysis in the
group boycott examination would then confront them with a contradiction
that they would be obliged to resolve. In so doing the Court would un-
doubtedly assert that the reason for the inconsistency is that the customer
restrictions or anti-competitive results are really irrelevant since it is the
group boycott itself that is per se illegal as a "restraint of trade."
There is, however, really nothing in the opinion of the Court that
militates against the unilateral enforcement of the "location clause" as
suggested by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion.26 For, as observed
above, its validity would be predicated on the reasonableness of the
customer restriction, to be determined by the motivations of General
Motors apart from the vitiating group boycott analysis,27 conceding that
the "location clause" itself does not violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act.28
The Court, in keeping with the expanding trend, applied a per se ap-
proach to a fact situation that patently commanded it. And, although the
Court, as it is wont to do, did not delineate what precisely was its holding
regarding the per se effect of group boycotts,29 it will serve as precedent
for future cases that may require substantiation for a per se declaration
of illegality in fact circumstances amounting to group boycotts or joint
refusals to deal without the finding or proof of an anti-competitive result.
David J. Pleva
25. See Robinson, supra note 22 at 268.
26. "In my opinion, however, General Motors is not precluded from enforcing the
location clause by unilateral action, and I find nothing in the Court's opinion to the con-
trary," 384 U.S. at 149.
27. The only determination made in this case was that of defendant's motivations as
induced and governed by the group action. Any independent determination would be
unsupported by the evidence which reflects only that "one of the purposes behind the
concerted effort to eliminate sales . . . was to protect franchised dealers from real or
apparent price competition," 384 U.S. at 147.
28. Rifkind, Division of Territories, Antitrust Law Symposium, [available from Com-
merce Clearing House, Inc., Chicago 46, Illinois] (1953), suggesting the possible weakness
of the Borro Hall holding.
29. See Rahl, supra note 23.
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